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Natural Abduction: the Bridge between Individuals Choices and the 
Production of Evolutionary Innovations 
 
Abstract 
Defenders of developmental systems theory have shown the need for a new 
evolutionary synthesis. However this effort requires a metaphysical evolutionary 
framework in which such an expanded synthesis can be embedded. I propose to 
develop a Peircean monist ontology by explaining the six characteristics or facets 
of reality labeled as: A) spontaneity, B) determinism, C) processing of information, 
D) statistical law, E) internally driven capricious choices and F) tendency to form 
habits. A special emphasis will be dedicated to characterize the predicates C and E 
as they provide the clue to the understanding of nature as a continuously open-
ended and unpredictable process, where its inherent creativity is analogized to an 
abductive inference. 
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Introduction 
Most of the difficulties that students face for understanding specific evolutionary problems, 
come not from lack of empirical evidence but are originated in our hegemonic mechanistic 
interpretation of nature, that they unconsciously subscribe to, in which change requires an 
explanation, since the a priori assumption is the inertness, changelessness and timelessness 
of matter.  People still believe that what must be explained is change, when indeed the 
basic a priori assumption should be that everything changes. In this paper, I take as an 
example the problem of whether evolutionary variations are directed or random in order to 
show that each one is based on different metaphysical assumptions, internalist and 
externalist respectively, and show how they can be integrated into a Peircean metaphysical 
framework. I am concerned with comprehension, understanding, creation of an integrated 
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view, dispatching the traditional mechanistic view. This paper questions the metaphysical 
and background assumptions that condition the choice of features are to be observed, the 
way they are observed and measured in order to obtain data, but what is more critical the 
way data are to be interpreted. As an alternative it is proposed the construction of a 
minimal metaphysical framework based on Peirce that will provide a consistent foundation 
for an expanded Darwinian synthesis. 
 
Evolutionary variations: Directed or random? 
Different views about the origin of evolutionary variations divide traditional Lamarckian 
(internalist) and Darwinian (externalist) schools. 1. Directed variations. According to 
Lamarck ([1809] 1986, pp: 126- 128) evolution obeys a plan of nature that tends to produce 
ever more complex forms and allows for secondary modifications dependent on the 
conditions of life through use and disuse in response to environmental conditions2. 
Lamarck’s system was based on an ontological description acknowledging the reality of both 
an external world ruled by Newtonian mechanics and an inner one that was the locus of the 
vital principle of heat, inner drives, impulses, and organizing tendencies. Lamarck proposed 
a series of parallel transformations arising from several events of spontaneous generation 
that tend to increase organization from insensitive to sensitive and finally to intelligent 
animals (Lamarck [1809] 1986, pp: 126-128). For Lamarck ontic states are referents of 
individual descriptions of actual forms that are seen as accidental deviations from a 
deterministic law given by the plan of nature. Considering that at the dawn of XIXth century 
it was widely accepted a Newtonian determinism it was not surprising that under similar 
physical conditions spontaneous generation should bring forth similar forms. Nonetheless, 
whereas simpler o lower living beings are shaped by physical forces, animals in which 
growing organization includes nervous systems and brain are shaped by habit, but always in 
full conformity with physical laws. In other words, as the inner organization increases in 
complexity organisms are ever more capable to counteract external influences, by internal 
accommodations of its body parts as induced by habits and use and disuse, a tenet that 
                                                 
2
 It is to be reminded that Darwin never denied that Lamarckian inheritance was possible and accepted as a means 
of modification also the effects of use and disuse (Darwin [1859] 1997, p. 123) (Depew & Weber 1996, p. 126), 
(Richards 1992, p. 103). 
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becomes a justification for an internalist stance. This ontological cut between internal 
(organized life) and external (Newtonian world of discrete particles) was, then, needed to 
inaugurate the discourse of biology, that in spite of its limitations becomes today one of the 
elements for an ontological framework that fits an expanded evolutionary synthesis.  
 
2. Random variations. Darwin spoke of chance variations in two senses. First in face of our 
ignorance of the causes of every individual variation, and second, to point out that there are 
variations that arise without respect to the needs of the organisms and of the conditions in 
which they live (Darwin [1859], 1997, pp: 121-123). Non directed random variations in the 
population became the raw material for natural selection. The Darwinian emphasis on 
natural selection is congruent with the received preconception about the passivity of 
matter. If ordering principles do not act from within the only formative factor should be 
external, were there no external organizing force, no form at all would be expected, since 
XIXth century physics did not provide any hint about how order could be originated from 
randomness. Following Depew and Weber (1995), Adam Smith had shown with great 
elegance that the laws of economy are utterly compatible with the Newtonian view of 
nature. Darwin adhered to Smith´s externalist “invisible hand” argument that equilibrates 
supply and demand and fixes the prices in the market where individuals strive to maximize 
individual benefit. Although natural selection was advanced under the ignorance of the 
inner structure of organisms, before the cellular theory and the chemical enzymatic theory 
of living processes were widely diffused and accepted, -not considering the Mendelian laws 
of heredity and molecular genetics- it served to solve the problem originated in the lack of a 
physically grounded account of evolution. The law of natural selection, regardless of how 
bloody and cruel it may be, leads to improvements, adaptations, equilibrium and harmony 
in the productions of nature. 
For present day Neo-Darwinians that recur to statistical models of selection, 
variations are random in the sense that all of them are equally likely to happen. However, 
Darwin’s clear cut distinction between individual (local) and population (global) phenomena, 
made possible an epistemic description in which every change of individual behavior must 
be contextualized in a given environment. Individuals’ tendencies to reproduce beyond 
resources and so to spontaneously diverge from the ancestor under the pressure of scarce 
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resources would inevitably arrive to a critical point where some will survive and some 
others will die. Natural selection balances the relation between resources and population 
while reduces the amount of available genetic variation in the population. Mental processes 
that for Descartes were considered the causal agency of order in the material world were 
then naturalized and replaced by natural selection when it was requested an account for the 
order observed in the living world. The point is that the causal ordering agency comes from 
without the organized system both in Cartesian and Darwinian conceptual systems.  
However natural selection works because the populations are composed of 
individuals that act as natural interpreters of external cues that enable them to gather and 
use environmental information and so survive the harsh conditions of scarcity. If survival 
can be understood in terms of individuals’ knowledge one can assert that Darwin made 
possible to draw epistemic descriptions that today become, as I will show below, one of the 
bases for an expanded evolutionary synthesis.      
In this paper I will discuss the role of the organisms’ individual choices within the 
immediate local circumstances as a factor of evolution inasmuch as it helps to understand 
the origin of evolutionary variations, in the context of an expanded evolutionary theory.  
 
Evolutionary variations and Developmental Systems Theory 
Developmental Systems Theory (DST) claims that variations are related to inextricable 
intertwined genetic and environmental factors, mediated by organisms (or developmental 
systems) according on the one hand to their capacity to buffer genetic and environmental 
perturbations, and on the other hand, to their responsiveness to environmental factors by 
means of structurally constrained behavioral, ontogenetic and physiological adjustments. In 
this context variations are not random, nor directed since they can only be examined 
considering the complex relationship between genotype, phenotype and environment 
(Oyama 2000, p.61), (Griffiths & Gray 1994), (Andrade 2004, 2005).  
According to Waddington (1961) development is represented as a fall down through a 
potential gradient. The topography of the epigenetic landscape is not prefixed by initial 
conditions, but instead it is reconfigured all along epigenesis as a result of interactions 
between genes, and between organisms and environment, that generate new bifurcating 
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epigenetic routes.  However, the dichotomy between genes and environment calls for the 





Figure 1. This epigenetic landscape stands for a dynamic interface between genes 
and environment, where developmental paths open up and are modified along 
development. The ball in the upper side stands for any undifferentiated system 
(cells, organism) that possesses many developmental possibilities. The deep valleys 
stand for stable developmental paths, whereas bifurcating points are unstable since 
small fluctuations produced either by the environment or by genetic mutations push 
the system towards one way or the other. This scheme also explains “genetic 
assimilation”, a process by means of which the effects induced by environmental 
factors could be genetically stabilized, in such a way as to become hereditary 
features that are manifested in absence of inducing stimuli. Genetic assimilation is 
made possible by the appearance of mutant genes, cooptation of existing genes, and 
rewiring of existing genetic networks (Carroll 2005, pp: 122-131) that produce an 
effect similar to that induced by the environment. (Figure was modified after 
Waddington, 195, in Slack 2002). 
 
According to this model genes participate in developmental regulation while their 
expression is regulated by non-linear interactions with environmental factors. Thus, a 
multitude of stable states in the form of canalized developmental paths is defined. 
Nonetheless, it can happen that a given developmental system leaves its path and jumps to 
another that leads to an evolutionary innovation by interaction with certain environmental 
signals (Waddington, 1961). According to Waddington (1961) “genetic assimilation” is the 
means by which a phenotypic change, during development, gets fixed in the genotype after 
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several generations, so stabilizing the modification for future generations. It, thus, implies 
selection for the adapted phenotype, through the fixation of allelic combinations that 
contribute to the stabilization of the new developmental path. Thence, genetic assimilation 
buffers genetic and environmental fluctuations within a threshold of stability that, if 
stepped across would give rise to a new developmental path.  
Canalization allows for accumulation of genetic variability in natural populations, and 
keeps the stability of phenotypes, so shielding variants from the action of natural selection. 
The accumulation of genetic variants increases evolutionary potential, as environmental 
conditions change some of these variants can be co-opted for new functions. Therefore, 
phenotypic modifications, use and disuse included, are prior to genetic accommodation and 
assimilation (West-Eberhardt, 2003, pp: 147-157; Jablonka & Lamb 1995 pp: 31-37, 1998, 
2004 pp: 262-265). The genotype always defines a set of possible developmental paths, 
however the interactions between organisms and environment are crucial in order to decide 
which specific path is to be taken. 
For Neo-Darwinians ontogeny depends on initial genetic conditions, and is 
independent of external conditions (closure), whereas for DST there is a close relation 
between genes and environment, namely that natural selection acts directly on the 
organism’s developmental phenotype and on the epigenetic processes that provide the 
phenotypic plasticity needed to maintain a functional interaction with the environment. 
Selection of phenotypes drags genotypes that respond to environmental pressures in a 
more or less coordinated way, without having to wait for the emergence of the right 
adaptive mutations by chance (Waddington 1976, pp: 135-144).  
DST broadens the genetic concept of heredity to include the action of epigenetic 
inheritance systems (Jablonka & Lamb 1995 pp: 79-110, 1998, 2004 pp: 113-146). Organisms 
transmit to their offspring something more than genes, like a number of factors needed for 
their own making. The ability to evolve is associated with morphogenetic plasticity. 
Ontogeny regulates phenotypic changes by influencing gene expression according to 
environmental inducing factors, so that we end up with complex relationships that range 
from “one genotype to many phenotypes in changing environments” to “many genotypes to 
one phenotype in a constant environment”. Genome must no longer be considered as a 
fixed program, but as one of the sources of information that, together with a multitude of 
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factors, define evolutionary potential (Oyama 2000, p: 66). Every single factor that 
contributes to development is an informational source; in consequence, genetic information 
requires natural interpretation, as it were, in such a way that out of the same genome 
different forms may arise depending on the context of interactions. Evolution results from 
an ongoing permanent open construction, not a priori fixed. Form comes about through 
interpretative processes mediated by developing organisms. 
It seems timely to recall that there is no fundamental distinction between innate and 
learned behavior, since development and behavior results out of organism/environment 
interactions (Kuo 1922, in Johnston, 2001), (Lehrman 1953, in Johnston, 2001), thence what 
is defined as ontogenetically innate was learned in the history of the lineage (Riedl 1983, p: 
216). Evolutionary processes are based on the organisms’ ability to perceive and to create 
for themselves an image of their surrounding world that enables them to use it for their 
own benefit.  
  
Peircean categories and Darwinism  
The three Peircean categories are needed to describe the categorical structure of all extant 
phenomena and require specification in differing research fields. Given that Peirce’s views 
subsume Darwin’s, I will use Peirce’s ontological system as the scaffolding for an expanded 
and generalized Darwinism. Within these guidelines I will show that the Darwinian triad 
variation, heredity, selection, can be understood as a realization of universal categories. 
 
This Darwinian principle is plainly capable of great generalization. Wherever 
there are large numbers of objects having a tendency to retain certain 
characters unaltered, however, not being absolute but giving room for chance 
variations… there will be a gradual tendency to change in directions of 
departure from them (CP 6.15).   
 
Darwinism as a conceptual system introduced a scheme for understanding reality that 
surpasses in depth and breadth, mechanical Cartesian ontology in correspondence with 
Peirce’s cartography based on the three categories firstness, secondness and thirdness and 
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the six characteristics or relations derived out of them: A) spontaneity, B) determinism, C) 
information, D) statistical law, E) tendency to diverge internally driven capricious choices 
due to  and F) tendency to form habits, (Andrade 2007), (Taborsky, 2002, 2006, 2008). By 
depth I mean that evolutionary theory covers every level of hierarchically organized living 
systems and by breadth, that the theory can be applied also to cosmological, and also 
cultural, linguistic, economic and social systems.  
A thorough examination of the six relations proposed by Taborsky (2002, 2004) is 
needed in order to draw the minimal metaphysical evolutionary scheme in which an 
expanded evolutionary theory would fit. Both the external/internal and 
individual/population cuts, define a Y-X “Peircean” plane in which the six relations derived 
from the three categories can be spotted (Andrade, 2007). A relation in this particular case 
is a facet of an integrated reality that can be characterized by three factors: 1. space (inner 
local, external local, inner global, external global), 2. Time (present, perfect, progressive) 
and 3. Mode (potentiality, actuality, necessarily).  
 
 
Figure 2. “Peircean” quadrant (modified after Taborsky 2002, 2006, by Andrade 
2007). The “vertical” axis refers to the Lamarckian cut (internal left and external 
right) and the “horizontal” axis to Neodarwinian cut (upper individual and lower 
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population). This scheme shows that an expanded Darwinism can be seen as a 
specific case of Peircean ontology founded on the three universal categories 
(firstness, secondness, thirdness) and the six derived relations A, B, C, D, E, F. The 
upper left quadrant A defines an internal /local zone; the upper right quadrant B 
defines an external /local zone. The lower left quadrant C defines an 
internal/population (global) domain and the lower right quadrant D defines an 
external /population (global). Also shown are the intersections E and F.  
 
 
A) Spontaneity: firstness as firstness [1-1] defines the local/internal field at the present 
time. Within the context of Peirce’s ontological system this relation can be understood as 
available energy, unconstrained informational capacity, chance, spontaneity, potentiality 
(Taborsky 2002, 2006, 2008). In the case of living entities this relation corresponds also to 
inner drives, feelings and motivations. This predicate stresses the ontological nature of 
chance, best understood as a potential or the input of an order generating process. This 
relation points out to the original basic ground of expanding energy or impulse that because 
of being unconstrained contains all potentiality; it is thus chance as a creative source of all 
reality. 
 It is worth reminding that an explicit recognition of this inner space was introduced 
into biology by Lamarck who advanced the vague notions of sentiment interieur, inner drives 
and organization (Andrade 2007). Lamarck accounted for all these inner activities in terms 
of a vital fluid of heat, whose existence was later refuted by the mechanical theory of heat, 
nonetheless his claims can be today understood as self-organizing processes that result out 
of the dynamics of open far-from-equilibrium systems. This concept of the internal 
organization is not only found in Lamarck it could be traced back to Aristotle and to several 
XVIIIth century authors like Kant and Cuvier. The emphasis on Lamarck is presented for two 
important reasons, first to show the complementarity of this conceptual view with the 
Darwinian approach looking for the construction of solid integrative framework for an 
expanded evolutionary theory that would be congruent with Peircean ontology. Second 
because among all pre-Darwinian authors Lamarck was perhaps the one that insisted the 
most on a physical account of spontaneous generation the forerunner of today´s concept of 
self-organization.    
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B) Determinism: secondness as secondness [2-2] defines the local/external field at a past 
perfect time (Taborsky 2002, 2006, 2008). Within the context of Peirce’s ontological system 
this predicate describes a facet of reality that refers to what is determinate and discrete, 
best revealed in all sorts of units or entities like particles, atoms, molecules, genes, DNA, 
proteins, prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells, organisms, structural modules, species, 
communities and so forth that define a nested hierarchical system. Nonetheless, this 
relation leads to classical reductionism when the lowest levels are seen as determinant 
factors. What is captured by this predicate is a mechanical description of the so given entity 
leaving aside the fact that its generation is due to self-organization and its persistence to 
structural stability and natural selection in a given context of interactions.   
 
C) Processing of Information: thirdness as secondness [3-2] defines the global/internal field 
at a continuous ongoing action in the present (Taborsky 2002, 2006, 2008). This relation 
refers the establishment of a communication network by means of continuous processes of 
information gathering and internalization of environmental information. This information is 
encoded, recorded and interpreted by making use of symbolic systems that are shared by a 
population of discrete entities. Encoded information registers internal representations of 
the external experienced world. To clarify matters this relation stands for both process of 
gathering and encoding environmental information (Andrade 2004) and the resultant codes 
understood as established relationships between symbolic systems. Encoded information 
not only stabilizes morphological conformations generated by interaction with 
environmental factors, but also serves to define future propensities, evolving capability, 
anticipation and innovation. Anticipation is an ability usually associated to an intelligent 
behavior that can be accounted for by the structural plasticity of the generated entities. 
When in a given environmental context an evolving structure can adopt more than one 
functional state, there is more than one possible solution for an unforeseen environmental 
challenge.  Thence, anticipation is an intelligent behavior associated to material systems 
that are plastic enough to alternate among several conformations that can be coupled to 
some environmental factors with varying degrees of affinity.   
Innovation is generated by combinatory and permutation of existing digital codes. In 
general digital codes are based on physical, chemical, biological, social interactions that 
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allow the translation from one language into another. This process of translation is also 
included in the relation [3-2], not the actual physical components that participate in this 
relation. DNA is the material format of a phylogenetic recorded history, but its meaning and 
function can only be revealed by a complexity of cellular processes and a higher-order 
system that makes this information useful. Codes are conventional rules historically 
established that enable an interpretant system to naturally translate one digital language 
into another. Therefore, while the translation of information from DNA to proteins is 
represented by relation [3-2], all kinds of discrete molecules that participate in this encoding 
and decoding process like DNA sequences, tRNA molecules, and proteins are of the nature 
of the [2-2] relation. The material description of molecules involved in translation of 
messenger RNA is independent on the encoded information they conveys. The encoding of 
this information is conventional given that the genetic code is arbitrary in the sense that the 
codon-amino acid assignments could have been different than they actually are (Stegman 
2004) and also because regardless of the encoded message, the translation follows the 
same rules.  
The notion of codes has been incorporated into biology, but its use has been 
restricted to DNA genetic code and human linguistic codes in order to account for the origin 
of life and the emergence of human language respectively. Barbieri (2003, p: 229-237) has 
pointed out that the emergence of different levels of organization requires the generation 
of its respective informative codes, to name a few: RNA splicing and processing codes that 
gave rise to eukaryotic cells, cell to cell adhesion codes that gave rise to multicellular 
organisms, the alignment of Hox genes that allowed the emergence of bilateral organisms 
and so on, although the arbitrariness of these codes is yet to be discussed. Thus, it seems 
that this relation has not been understood because the DNA-centered view of mainstream 
biology stressed a deterministic interpretation of life, in which evolutionary changes are due 
to DNA chance mutations and not to organisms´ urge to permanently gather of 
environmental information. The DNA-centered view restricts the combinatorial power to 
permutations of nucleotides in DNA and exons in eukaryotic genes and overlooks its 
amazing power derived from the modularity at every level of organization (Kirschner and 
Gerhardt 2005). In consequence the notion of codes has been restricted to the elements 
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that are actually engaged in coding and decoding information, not in the information or the 
effective actions they induce.  
Ontogenetic modifications are possible because life is made out of quasi-autonomous 
modules that can vary while their basic architecture and relations among them are 
preserved (Kirschner & Gerhardt, 2005, p: 220-224). The living world is not made out of 
puzzle like pieces that only fit very precise positions, but of a limited set of LEGO plastic 
ones that can perform more than one function. This explains why variations in spite of being 
structurally constrained can exhibit nevertheless an amazing plasticity that can be 
accommodated to a wide range of environmental circumstances. In this combinatorial 
power and phenotypic plasticity together, lie the possibility of creating internal models of 
the external reality before it is decided which one will be employed to cope with a specific 
environmental challenge. The Umwelt building abilities of organisms (Von Uexküll [1940] 
1982) are associated with relations A (spontaneity) and C (processing of information) that 
directly address the inner aspect of reality (subjectivity) in their individual and collective 
forms, respectively. Organisms are, thence, real subjects (Baldwin 1896) and Umwelt 
builders (Hoffmeyer 1996, p: 54-58). The higher organisms` complexity are, the more 
complex and abundant are the internal models that must be sorted out before testing a 
specific one.  
 
D) Statistical law: thirdness as firstness [3-1] defines the population/external field at a 
continuous ongoing action in the present. This relation statistically describes populations of 
atoms, molecules, genes, DNA, proteins, prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells, organisms, 
structural modules, species, and communities, respectively. Populations are described by a 
statistical distribution of a given parameter gauged for every individual in the population. In 
the case of populations of organisms, regularities are expressed as averages and dispersion 
values for a specific feature in the population that are thought of as outcomes of natural 
selection. In this sense, this is a well-known relation fully incorporated into mainstream 
biology, since for Darwinian natural selection shifts the average values for a given 
parameter as the population progresses towards adaptive states. Moreover natural 
selection may also sharpen, widen, flatten and divide the dispersion values encompassed by 
the bell shaped curves.  
 




E) Internally driven capricious choices: secondness as firstness [2-1] defines the spatial 
internal/external, local (individual)/global (population) and the temporal 
present/past/present progressive interface. This relation describes actions that convert 
analog codes into digital ones and vise-versa (Hoffmeyer & Emmeche 1991), by means of 
establishing a connecting network. I equate this relation a tendency to diverge depending 
on individual’s choices that can be understood only when looked upon in the context of 
other relations and as associated to thirdness. Peirce (C.P. 6.302) tried to reconcile the 
Lamarckian and Darwinian views of evolution by using as an example Clarence King’s theory 
that proposed that evolutionary variations are neither random, nor directed, but instead 
generated by the organisms’ tendency to adapt to a changing local environment (Aalto 
2004). King opposed a gradualist view of change, arguing that drastic changes in the 
environment trigger rapid morphological modifications in plastic species. In today’s 
language he was undoubtedly referring to phenotypic plasticity. Peirce did not neglect the 
importance of natural selection though he thought it required an internal election 
mechanism associated with the organism’s mental activity that acts under the pressure of 
selective conditions. This Neo-Lamarckian mechanism leads to developmental 
differentiation processes oriented to specific goals that bring forth ever greater 
diversification and adaptation to local conditions. 
This mode of evolution oriented to specific goals by means of external pressures and 
habit modification, reconciles chance and necessity (Peirce 1891). As individual organisms 
strive to anticipate daily challenges; the population of individual minds strives to reach a 
state of regularity and generality by harmonically integrating the diversity of tendencies that 
are constantly arising. Nutrition is a simple example of individual election mediated by 
specific recognition of adequate food stuff (C.P. 6.238-71). Intelligent responses lead to 
more or less correct choices and habit fixation that contribute to perpetuate life processes. 
Living systems learn by experience in accordance with a general process to develop habits 
and, given that matter (effete mind) is strictly ruled by habits (Peirce, CP 4.551), the universe 
as a whole evolves according to the same law. What from an externalist point of view is 
matter, is nothing more than ‘consciousness’ or ‘living feeling’ from an internalist point of 
view, that is to say that the emergence of mechanical laws are due to the acquisition of 
 
Signs vol. 5 (2011): pp. 112-146, 2011  
ISSN: 1902-8822 
125 
habits. Thence, it is thus badly needed to integrate internal external, individual populations 
relations in order to understand evolution. 
The point is again that natural selection, as an external action, requires the prior 
existence of internally driven capricious choices. Nonetheless, natural selection favors 
phenotypes that are able to respond to changing conditions. To acknowledge that 
organisms execute intentional behaviors in matters related with the immediate conditions 
of life does not conflict with the idea of an open-ended and unpredictable evolution, in 
other words evolutionary unpredictability is founded on the existence of creative 
intentional responses at the individual level. Individual elections were clearly explained by 
Baldwin (1896) as he put forward a new factor in evolution named “organic selection”. 
According to Levins and Lewontin (1985, pp: 99-101) organisms determine what is relevant, 
alter the external world as they interact with it, transduce the physical signals that reach 
them from the outside world, transform the statistical pattern of environmental variation in 
the external world and modify their surviving strategies, so generating the conditions of 
their own selection. Organisms are not objects of selection, but the subjects of a cognitive 
subject-object relation. Natural selection shapes the population statistical regularity of a 
multitude of individual’s choices, by favoring the organic and genetic constitution of plastic 
individuals that manage to modify their surviving strategies. Therefore individual elections 
are at the base of evolutionary process since survival is for individuals that manage to 
develop adequate strategies oriented to exploit the environment in their own benefit.  
 
F) Habit: thirdness as thirdness [3-3] is a property of every informational dynamical system, 
and it is here used to define the internal-local/external-global interface. This relation 
corresponds to a continuity and regularity that is responsible for habit taking, a predicate 
yet to be introduced, justified and formalized in order to understand that the law-like 
character of natural selection is a consequence of this relation. 
 
If the laws of nature are results of evolution, this evolution must proceed 
according to some principle, and this principle will itself be of the nature of a 
law. But it must be such a law that it can evolve or develop itself. (…) Evidently 
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it must be a tendency toward generalization, - a generalizing tendency. But 
any fundamental universal tendency ought to manifest itself in nature. Where 
shall we look for it? (…) But we must search for this generalizing tendency 
rather in such departments of nature where we find plasticity and evolution 
still at work. The most plastic of all things is the human mind, and next after 
that comes the organic world, the world of protoplasm. Now the generalizing 
tendency is the great law of mind, the law of association, the law of habit 
taking. We also find in all active protoplasm a tendency to take habits. Hence I 
was led to the hypothesis that the laws of the universe have been formed 
under a universal tendency of all things toward generalization and habit 
taking. (Peirce C.P. 7.515). 
 
This relation is currently disregarded since scientists take for granted the existence of 
universal, eternal and unchanging natural laws and very seldom inquire about their origin. 
The current concept of natural laws shared by scientists is at best a limiting ideal case of an 
evolving law. Self-organization is the closest we have to a Peircean concept of an evolving 
law. According to Kauffman (2000, pp: 197-219), self-organization is a universal law that 
rules the constant exploration of forms and processes in the “adjacent possible”, so 
broadening the space of semiosis to the entire history of the cosmos that makes 
propagative organization wholly dependent on energy extraction. Agents spot their 
particular sources of energy by interpreting the information they manage to gather about 
their surroundings.  The inherent unpredictability of the outcome of organisms’ action 
would lead to view habit as a blind final cause. Short (2002, 2007) argues a non-mechanistic 
interpretation of natural selection that is nontrivially teleological as he explains the 
differences between “selection of concrete genetic variants” and “selection for an abstract 
type of feature” within a Neo-Darwinian framework.  
 
Patterns of outcome, whether biological or thermodynamic, cannot be 
explained by tracing causal chains, even were that possible. They are 
explicanda of a special kind. The form of their explanation, in statistical 
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mechanics or by natural selection, is not captured by statistical variants of the 
covering-law model or related models of explanation. In them as in classical 
teleology, types of outcome are cited to explain why there are outcomes of 
those types. But only when types are explanatory by being ‘‘selected for’’, as 
in explanations of animal and human behavior as well as in Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection, but not in statistical mechanics, is the explanation 
teleological. Darwin’s theory is nontrivially teleological. (Short 2002).  
 
However while subscribing to Short´s view I want to remark the fact that natural selection 
owes its existence to self-organization that qualifies as the most general explanation of 
Peircian habit so far. Natural selection requires the prior existence of a population in which 
every individual is subject to arbitrary somatic or phenotypic adjustments as explained by 
developmental systems theory.  
The introduction of characteristics E (tendency to diverge due to internally driven 
capricious choices) and F (habit forming tendency), will definitively foster the understanding 
of the existing relations among the different facets of reality for instance, internal dynamics, 
chance and indetermination can all be accepted provided we simultaneously assumed the 
existence of organization laws responsible for regularity and continuity in evolutionary time 
(thirdness).  
 
Evolution and development are processes of sign interpretation 
The history of science teaches how different kinds of entities were identified and defined 
from subatomic particles to organisms; today’s challenge is to understand them in their 
context of interrelations and to integrate them within a monistic3 dynamic framework. 
Dualism is incompatible with evolutionary thought for it fails to integrate physical, biological 
and mental processes.  Conceptual and ideological preconceptions have force us to talk 
                                                 
3
 Monism states that the ultimate ground of reality, whatever it might be, is a manifestation of a 
continuum which in its permanent transformation and organization manifests as energy, matter, life or 
mind. It is a monism that is based on processes not on a fundamental subtle substance. To base natural 
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about matter and mind as if they were separate independent substances, by preventing us 
from coining a new word that stands for the continuum “energy-matter-life-mind”. The 
Cartesian anthropocentric idea of mind became an almost insurmountable obstacle that 
prevents us from overcoming dualisms; nonetheless we must try to conceive reality as a 
whole that can be approached through seamless continuity of the above referred 
characteristics. There is nothing supernatural in life and mind, since the so called living and 
mental processes involved in organisms’ individuation correspond to far-from-equilibrium 
non-deterministic open systems that develop in particular contexts.  
Natural processes have directionality in the sense that thirdness requires secondness, 
and secondness requires firstness. But the sequential order of categories did not and does 
not apply, nonetheless the general von Baerian law according to which developmental 
systems go from the more general to the most specific, holds because the iterative 
interpretation of signs makes the output (interpretant) ever more differentiated and 
individuated (see figure 3). In the beginning there were a formless chaos, a purely random 
universe, a state of disorder and indetermination without any tendency or detectable 
regularity, a state of energy radiation at equilibrium. That was sheer pure firstness, a state 
of homogeneous timelessness out of which order came about. The emergence of order 
required the rupture of this symmetry, presumably 100.000 years after the Big Bang as a 
result of the expansion of the universe (Chaisson 2001, p.130). The formation of energy 
gradients made possible the intervention of habit, as the seed of generalizing tendencies in 
the form of local organization of matter. A random innovation came out of chaos and 
produced a reaction that preserved its state in a form of ever more genuine secondness. 
Organismic life crystallized on earth as a result of chemical and physical processes four 
billion years ago, and very likely elsewhere in the universe. From then onwards ever more 
sophisticated interactions were selected in a Darwinian way, so creating the co-evolutionary 
unfolding of the biosphere that brought forth complex systems like human language and 
thought.   
The question of whether semiosis is universal or instead restricted to living systems 
would be clarified as it is recognized the existence of both analog (iconic, indexical) and 
digital (symbolic) sign actions in the living world, whereas physical and chemical (subatomic, 
atomic, molecular) systems are restricted to analog sign actions (iconic, indexical). The 
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creative and combinatorial power of subatomic particles and between atoms themselves is 
produced by specific interactions (attractive and repulsive forces, chemical affinities, stereo 
chemical complementarity, etc) with mediating particles in the context of a population of 
particles. It is very likely that actually existing material arrays of subatomic particles were 
produced by combinatorial rules with the intervention of other particles that played the role 
of a third and not just by random collision among them or lucky coincidence. Every newly 
generated particle could then have played the mediating role for the generation of new 
aggregates and so forth. The identification of such non arbitrary analog codes are sufficient 
to justify Peircean pansemiosis as a universal cosmic phenomenon that manifests itself 
without any doubt with higher specificity and intensity in living systems as they make use in 
addition to symbolic codes. 
Firstness is associated to an entropic factor and thirdness to an antientropic factor 
related to a Maxwell demon4 like activity (Esposito 1980, p. 169), and not to a pre-
established harmony or an infinite divine intelligence (CP 6.132) (Esposito 1980, p. 131). 
Both the antientropic principle, the tendency to adopt habits, and the entropic principle, the 
tendency to breakdown habits (Andrade 2003, pp: 127-137) are necessary for the 
understanding of Nature. Mind action is twofold, it moves from chaos to order by 
developing regularities and habit taking, but it also destroys habits, so preventing evolution 
and change from getting exhausted and becoming frozen.  
Signs can be said to be functional sets built up out of three relations (Taborsky 2002, 
2006, 2008). All existent forms, living or inert, are signs that can be expressed as: 1. Input → 
3. Mediation → 2. Output.  In figure 3, it is shown how the interpretant (output) becomes 
the mediating sign in the next iteration, so that sign and interpretant evolve together with 
each iteration until the final interpretant fully captures the specificity of the object. As 
mentioned above the iterative interpretation of signs makes the interpretant (output) ever 
more differentiated and individuated.  
 
                                                 
4
Maxwellian demons were paradoxically assumed to create local order out of molecular disorder and 
random movement by means of work actions executed in accord with information about position and 
velocity of individual molecules that bounce in a closed chamber. According to Zurek (1990) it is 
physically realistic and feasible to conceive an Information Gathering and Using System if three 
conditions are met: 1. far-from-equilibrium, 2. openness, 3. inner structure that enables the creation of 
a memory record. For a detailed explanation see Andrade (2003, pp: 121-133). 
 





Figure 3. Sign is a triad of irreducible relations between object (O), sign or 
representamen (R) and interpretant (I). As the sign iterates itself, the dynamical 
interpretant (DI) becomes a new sign or representamen that mediates between the 
object (in put) and the new interpretant (out put), that becomes a new sign or 
representamen, and so on until the final interpretant (FI) is produced. 
 
According to Hoffmeyer (1996, p: 20), ontogeny is a process of sign interpretation, in which 
the potentiality of genetic information (input) is realized into specific developmental 
pathways (output).  The fertilized egg (sign or representamen) selects a few of the many 
possible pathways by constantly controlling gene expression in a given cellular context, so 
that given the same genetic information and environment, interpretation would tend to be 
repeated according to the same guidelines, although new interpretations may occur 
opening up new developmental routes that become variations upon which natural selection 
will act. Likewise, evolution is also a process of sign interpretation (Hoffmeyer 1996, p:22). 
The ecological niche offers a multitude of possibilities and opportunities to the population 
(firstness), but only very few are selected, in a move that yields, in the next generation, a 
population with a fitter genetic composition (secondness). The key point is that this 
operation is mediated by the organisms’ interpretation of their surroundings. The new 
genetic composition defines the set of possible ontogenies that might develop in the next 
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generation. In consequence evolution and development are tightly entailed in an unbroken 
loop. Environmental action is twofold, it acts as an informative factor of development and 
also as a filter, but in either case the environment is the product of organisms’ construction 
(Andrade 2009, pp: 357-360). I do not pretend to ignore that there can be large scale 
perturbations or catastrophes that are not constructs or the organisms and should 
nevertheless be considered as part of the environment.  
 
Natural abduction 
In epistemology the origin of new hypotheses is explained by abduction, a form of inference 
in which guessing is goal oriented by experience towards the specification of a particular 
end, while taking chances and making the best of ignorance. Observed cases trigger the 
formulation of a set of tentative hypotheses and habit guides the election of the particular 
one that is going to be tested. A Popperian conjecture (Popper  1968, p: 240-248) that fails, 
to demonstrate its internal coherence and its ability to solve a specific problem in a better 
way than previously existing theories, is rejected. Accepted hypotheses provide new 
explanatory rules that reinterpret observed data, and orient future research that might 
provide a mathematical formal model. In an analogous manner, natural abduction is the 
process through which organisms elaborate a possible response to environmental changing 
conditions by using all existing structural resources accumulated and selected along 
evolutionary processes. This is congruent with Jacob’s “tinkering” model of evolution. 
According to Jacob (1977), evolution does not conform to an engineer’s plan in which every 
single detail was preordained to fit a specific function, but rather it works out like a tinkerer 
with what it has at hand in order to build up a workable contraption.  
 
In contrast to the engineer, evolution does not produce innovations from 
scratch. It works on what already exists, either transforming a system to give it 
a new function or combining several systems to produce a more complex one. 
Natural selection has no analogy with any aspect of [conscious] human 
behavior. If one wanted to use a comparison, however, one would have to say 
that this process resembles not engineering but tinkering, bricolage as we say 
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in French.  While the engineer’s work relies on his having the raw materials 
and the tools that exactly fit his project, the tinkerer manages with odds and 
ends. Often without even knowing what he is going to produce, he uses 
whatever he finds around him, old cardboard boxes, pieces of string, 
fragments of wood of metal, to make some kind of workable object. As 
pointed by Claude Levi Strauss, none of the materials at the tinkerer’s disposal 
has a precise and definite function. Each can be used in different ways. (Jacob, 
1977).  
 
That is, that existing structures selected for a particular function are forced to perform new 
functions in a new context.  If organ A (fins) is used for task B (to swim), and if task B is 
similar to task C (to crawl on dry land), then organ A can be used to perform task C. The 
tentative hypothesis or abduction is that if task B is similar to task C, therefore, if A then C. 
In consequence fins will develop into legs as it is assumed to have occurred when ancient 
fishes conquered dry land.   
Abductive inference is the simultaneous expression of predicates E, “internally driven 
capricious elections” and F, “tendency to form habits”. Relation E opens up new 
possibilities, while F makes possible further abductive responses. Following Peirce (CP 
2.372-388; 5.171; 6.470-473; 7.202-203) abduction plays the most important role in the 
generation and evolution of knowledge.  
It is important to clarify what is meant by abduction and the reasons why evolution 
does not work solely by deduction and induction. Evolution by natural deduction would be 
equivalent to the execution of a program that retrieves as its output a form which was 
somehow prefixed or encoded in the initial conditions, not a real novelty, just mere 
following of coded instructions. Evolution by deduction is the standpoint of preformism, 
regardless of whether it works in accord to a natural plan (Lamarckians) or in compliance to 
a fixed genetic program (Neo-Darwinians). On the other hand, evolution by natural 
induction is like a classical Darwinian process that starts with a wide diversity of forms out of 
which only those that match the rules imposed by a determinate environment will survive 
and generate offspring.  
 




Neither induction, nor deduction, account for the origin of new hypotheses, in an analogous 
manner evolution cannot rely exclusively on blind chance exploration of the entire 
morphospace, and not either on deterministic definition of the right configuration. Instead, 
the origin of evolutionary variations depends on random biased search of a limited 
morphospace (the set of forms that are really attainable at a defined time in what Kauffman 
(2000, p. 197-219) defines as the “adjacent possible”). Likewise, abduction is based on 
selection of internal states (genetic and epigenetic) that function as representation of their 
external world, oriented by guessing and intuitions that lead to venture an alternative that 
can be right or wrong, in the former case there is survival in the second death. Individual 
chance events are always contextualized by specific local environmental conditions and 
structurally constrained, as a specific action is decided by a population of agents, their 
outcomes can be shown to follow a statistical law (D) in which the dispersion around the 
average value results out of independent target aiming trials. Thus, phenotypic adjustments 
(physiological, developmental and behavioral) are like choices, though structurally 









Figure 4. Evolution from randomness and chaos to regularity of habit formation, is 
represented by a series of graphics where the “y” axis corresponds to the probability 
of a given event and the “x” axis to different possible events. a) Randomness (all 
events are equally likely). b) Statistical distribution in which all values tend to vary 
around an average with a wide range of random variations. c) Statistical distribution 
in which the variation range is reduced. d) Limiting unreachable state where 
everything functions according to a deterministic law. 
 
The above figure shows how individual choices form a continuum that lies between pure 
chance and absolute determination. Due to the individuals’ aim at hitting an arbitrary chosen 
specific target, a statistical distribution emerges in the population. When there is no 
informational guiding in every individual choice, all outcomes would be equally likely, as 
shown in the ideal case “a”, random uniform distribution. The other limiting case is 
determinism or the situation where the output is always the same, a situation that Peirce 
explained as the result of extreme habit fixation by learning. The choice of target that defines 
the average value cannot be computed from the input since there is always an element of 
free choice between different outcomes as was explained above in reference to relation E 
(tendency to diverge due to internally driven capricious choices) and also congruent with  
figure 1. Real life situations correspond to cases “b”and “c”, where there is always an element 
of both chance and necessity, since creativity is made possible by individual’s effort to choose 
a new action that if selected would define the average value of a new statistical distribution.  
It is impossible to explain absolute randomness (figure 4, case a) because to account 
for something is to uncover the order it may possess, if a random sequence of events is 
shown to have some regularity, it ceases to be random. Likewise, the opposite extreme of 
determinism given by absolute generality (figure 4, case d) cannot be explained either, since 
it would assume in the explanandum the existence of a still more general law that would be 
the explanans. Only intermediary cases (figure 4, cases b, and c) between chance and 
complete determination can be explained in reference to other cases that are also a mixture 
of chance and determination. The explanation can be formulated in relation to Peircean 
categories, so to speak that laws can be explained because some amount of randomness 
remains. Chance constantly breaks down frozen habits and regularities while new habits and 
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habit change are always being generated making use of random fluctuations. In the long 
term randomness decreases, as potentiality wanes, order, stability and predictability wax.  
Interpretation is always mediated by habit, which is reinforced at every iteration (see 
figure 3), making of abduction an inference that is ever getting closer to the “truth”. The fact 
that uncertainty decreases in local contexts, makes that the possibility of error (fallibility) 
never be completely eliminated. Natural abduction refers to the fact that phenotypic 
adjustments (physiologic, ontogenetic, behavioral) are not random, but directed to solve, by 
means of all structural resources produced in evolutionary time, a problem posed by the 
conditions of life, in an analogous way to the learner’s elaborate internal representations and 
suggests conjectures by using existing theories, tending towards the solution of a conceptual 
problem.  
Abduction plays with similarities that trigger new interactions between already existing 
units, what is new is the interaction, not the entities or the structural motifs involved in that 
specific interaction. The dynamics of epigenetic landscapes are made up, both, of stable 
chreods that constitute channels of developmental pathways (see figure 1), and of 
innovations that happen at the unstable bifurcation points where a decision is taken, partly by 
chance (developmental noise), partly by “reasons” that belong exclusively to the developing 
systems. To understand the organisms’ reasons is to understand their Umwelts as something 
that we as humans can imagine but never really grasp since we are unable to put ourselves in 
the center of someone else’s Umwelt. Once the path is taken, if it proves to be the successful 
choice, it will be selected for and stabilized along evolution. Environmentally induced 
phenotypes could become stable by natural selection of genotypes that stabilize individual 
somatic adjustments (phenotypic accommodation) (West-Eberhardt 2003, p. 157) by means 
of genetic assimilation (Waddington 1961). The point is that phenotypic (analog) adjustments 
by interaction with environmental factors are prior to genetic (digital) encoding, in the same 
manner that abduction is prior to formal theories that are to be tested by induction and 
deduction. Decisions are the outcome of abductions based on the agents’ created internal 
representations about the immediate circumstances.  
Peirce metaphorically stated: 
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Besides, you cannot seriously think that every little chicken that is hatched has 
to rummage through all possible theories until it lights upon the good idea of 
picking up something and eating it (Peirce n.d.:Ms. 475 quoted by Harrowitz 
1988, p: 196). 
 
The above quotation serves to solve a recurrent question in evolutionary biology in 
reference to how the space of all possible configurations (morphospace) and all genetic 
permutations (genetic space) are explored before the good one is picked up. Considering 
that the space of possibilities is astronomically immense in real time it is physically 
impossible to expect an exhaustive exploration by random search5. 
In the context of organisms, these exploratory biases may be characterized as 
abductions. Contrary to Dawkins evolution is not totally blind but instead works by making 
something analogous to abductive inferences.  
I argue that the Darwinian triad, [Variation (V) (input) → Natural selection (S) 
(mediation) → Heredity (H) (output)], that identifies the core of Darwinian theory is a 
specific case of the more general Peircean triad, [Firstness (input) → Thirdness (mediation) 
→ Secondness (output)] (Andrade 2007). As mentioned above evolution can be represented 
as a series of iterations where the output becomes the mediator in the next iteration and so 
on (figure 3). I will show that each component of the Darwinian graph V, H and S, can be 
likewise be conceived as a graph, that can be used to build up of a higher order isomorph 
graph that provides a schema for an expanded evolutionary new synthesis.  
 
                                                 
5
 Levinthal (1968) expressed this problem as the protein folding paradox. If a protein were to attain 
its correctly folded configuration by sequentially sampling all the possible conformations, it would 
require a time longer than the age of the universe to arrive at its correct native conformation, even if 
all possible conformations were sampled at nanosecond or picosecond rates. Considering the very 
large number of degrees of freedom in an unfolded polypeptide chain of 100 residues that will have 
99 peptide bonds and therefore 198 different phi and psi bond angles, and if each bond angles can be 
in one of three stable conformations, the protein may misfold into 3
198
 different conformations. 
However the "paradox" is that most proteins fold spontaneously on a millisecond or even 
microsecond time scale, given that within the cytoplasmic environment the explorations of the native 
protein structure are biased and guided by local interactions, some configurations are preferred by 
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1. Variation as a manifestation of firstness can be accounted for by the triad: [Inner drive 
(input) → Statistical law (mediation) → from random to biased search (output)]. This biased 
search is the abduction that mediates the subsequent iterations that produce variants that 
go from pure randomness to more or less, oriented or biased towards specific 
environmental cues (Andrade 2004) (see figures 4 and 5). 
 
2. Heredity as a manifestation of secondness can be accounted for by the triad: [Reaction to 
the environment (input) → Gathering, processing and encoding of environmental 
information  → Genetic accommodation and assimilation (output)]. The subsequent 
iterations will be mediated by genetic information that fixes genetic hereditary content, in 
the long run as a final output.   
 
3. Natural selection as a manifestation of thirdness can be accounted for by the triad: 
[Statistical law (input) → Tendency to form habits (mediation) → Gathering, processing and 
encoding of environmental information (output)]. Further iterations mediated by gathering, 
processing and encoding of environmental information will tend to produce new internal 
representations that streamline the reproduction and ontogeny of individualized entities 
and at evolutionary time make possible the emergence of new levels of organization.  
  
The integration of the triads (1.2.3) generates a higher order triad that describes the process 
of abduction: [More or less biased search (input) → Tendency to form habits (mediation) → 
Genetic hereditary content (output)].  This last triad describes that as it is progressively 
iterated “random search” becomes a “biased search” that never reaches the point of an 
immediate, directed “reaction to the environment” (see figure 4). This “biased search” is 
best seen as the relations E and F, “individual choices” and “tendency to take habits” acting 
together. “Individual elections” are half way between the chance of “random search” and 
the determination imposed by the “reaction to the environment”, because they are 
abductions or inferences made by using previous knowledge that enable organisms to cope 
with new observations or environmental factors in a truly creative way that is permanently 
happening in evolution. Evolution would be a series of diverging continuous unpredictable 
creations and explorations, neither blind nor directed, of an extraordinary realm of 
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possibilities performed by a population of agents that are forced to decide in hazardous 
situations due to scarcity of resources, time pressure and what is more important with 
uncompleted information about their immediate environment, but nonetheless capable of 
interpreting their surroundings and creating internal representations of it. This learning 
ability allows the production of functional responses to pressing challenges. Abductions 
manifest in the form of individual choices that become the dynamical input of processes of 
sign interpretation like development and evolution. Darwinian natural selection preserves 
the agents that made the adequate abductions in local conditions and becomes the 
expression of an organizing tendency to form and preserve habits by converting statistical 
regularities into informational codes. 
 
Conclusion: Evolutionary Open-endedness and Uncertainty  
Evolutionary uncertainty about the future is a direct consequence of having to live with 
incomplete information about the environment. This insufficient information is the result of 
two facts: 1. the cost of information gathering, 2. finiteness of recording capacity. Any living 
system must invest energy in order to explore and gather information about its immediate 
environment; an investment that is rewarded as new sources of energy are spotted. 
Information about the possible sources of available energy is communicated in the form of 
signs that organisms learn to interpret adequately. There can never be an informational inner 
model of the environment that is complete in its description because of the exploration cost 
that forces the organisms to decide how much gathered information is enough. In addition, 
the finiteness of the perception range permitted by the senses and recording capacity 
depends on the structural complexity of the receptor’s organs that makes that available 
information always incomplete. All these factors assure that agents always face some degree 
of uncertainty, so making abduction necessarily risky, nonetheless to take chances is the only 
way to keep functionally active and therefore to evolve.  
The idea of evolution by abduction stresses the point that novelty does not come out of 
nothing but by establishing unpredictable yet locally functional interactions between existing 
entities. In fact the notion of interactions abounds in modern biology; an interaction implies a 
specific recognition followed by a structural adjustment in a specific local environment. For 
instance proteins and RNA exhibit alternative folded native states, cells present a potential 
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towards differentiating along diverse paths and exhibit alternative structures as they 
differentiate, and individual organisms present plastic physiological and behavioral states in 
response to the environment. It can, thence, be stated that living entities, in fact, are forced 
to capriciously choose or decide, in the sense that organic structures oscillate between 
different conformations, and which one will be stabilized depends on how the agent interacts 
with environmental factors. Interactions are driven by the need to capture free energy (see 
above relation A or [1-1]).  
The relation between ignorance and indetermination would lead to a pragmatic 
indeterminism that we are forced to adopt in the face of the complex diversity of the world 
that we cannot directly explore. This indetermination that evolution keeps for itself is due to 
the fact that it operates by abduction. With the purpose of improving the theory of natural 
selection Margaleff (1996, p. 122) stated: 
 
Basically it is a matter of examining whether decision processes that define who 
will survive and who will die are really uniform. There is a suspicion that 
organisms themselves, depending upon the degree of organization, can modify 
decision processes that were very simple in the past, making them more 
complicated along evolution. In this manner there would be an evolution in the 
forms of natural selection, and therefore, an evolution of evolution, that is 
coherent with information’s surprising capacity to fold back on itself.  (Margalef 
1996, p. 122). 
 
As the outcomes of abductions become more specific, decision processes become more 
directed and complicated along evolution. The information’s surprising capacity to fold back 
on itself is best explained by sign iteration in which the interpretant becomes the mediating 
sign in the next iteration (see figure 3). 
The analogy between the origin of new ideas and evolutionary novelties is best 
founded on the idea that evolutionary variations operate as an analog of abductive 
inference. The problem lies in the fact that evolutionary variations are assumed to be 
random whereas the emergence of new ideas is assumed to be the outcome of conscious 
effort oriented to solve specific problems.  Neo-Darwinians claim that biological production 
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of new evolutionary variations is both mathematically random and independent of 
organisms’ needs (blind), by contrast if the evolution of new ideas is goal-directed it would 
fit into the Neo-Darwinian scheme. However I think that this argument stems from a well 
rooted prejudice that no longer holds. This argument ignores the fact that the very idea of 
blind random variations (mutations) cannot account for evolution, for they occur within the 
context of phenotypic adjustments that are directed and structurally constrained. In the 
same vein, the evolution of ideas is not directed either, this prejudice has to do with the fact 
that the role played by abduction has been overlooked by classical epistemology more 
concerned with how theories were validated, not with how they were created. Besides, it is 
necessary to question the way we perceive ourselves through the lens of an idealized 
rationality that prevents us from understanding that our decisions are made with 
incomplete and insufficient information so that we are surprised by undesired and 
unforeseen side effects. In our Cartesian idealization of rationality, we came to believe that 
we are in possession of an exclusively human faculty whereas, in fact, abduction is a form of 
inference tightly entangled to inductive and deductive thinking. The point is that abductive 
inferences are not exclusively human, since they are performed by living beings that try out 
the best possible response to challenging conditions (Andrade 2009, p:374). What might be 
exclusively dependent on a more complex brain organization are inductive and deductive 
forms of inference, that enable the elaboration of a more complex and abstracts abductions 
in the case of humans, but all three (abduction, induction, deduction) are embedded in the 
permanent semiotic interpretations of signs that occurs in living nature.  
The incomplete certainty offered by science fortunately always leaves freedom for 
innovation, heuristic creativity, analog search, intuition and symbiosis among different and 
diverging branches of knowledge and everything that rekindles the proliferation of 
hypotheses. To venture a hypothesis to be submitted to the harsh test of academic rigor of a 
scientific community is the only way to broaden the horizon of knowledge. 
Likewise, in economy the incomplete handling of information, e.g. about the market, 
forbids the dominance of fully deductive inferences; all prescriptions are founded on 
statistical tendencies and frequently fail. However, the inductivist way would certainly not be 
feasible, since to try out one by one all possible solutions, would be extremely costly in terms 
of energy expense and time. Darwin established the analogy between the economy of nature 
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and human economy, yet to be developed. This great breakthrough fits better with the idea 
that natural agents act and choose by abduction, risking their lives in order to gather limited 
information out of the environment. Abduction is partially blind, but capable of being guided 
by habit. It is worth the risk of pursuing specific ends. Although agents tend to minimize risks 
at the local level, the outcome seldom coincides with the aimed target, since both aims and 
targets change constantly. Therefore, natural abduction must be constantly iterated and 
natural selection as an expression of habit forming tendency must be allowed to fix adequate 
behaviors. One of the reasons the scientific status of economy is disputed comes from not 
understanding the role of abduction in the generation of knowledge. But if we interpret the 
game in which economic agents are engaged, as one of abductive inferences about their 
conditions of life oriented to decision making, may they be transient and local, we would 
capture the scientific status of economy and, in a better way, that of biology (Andrade 2009, 
p: 375).  
Darwin chose a fruitful analogy when he decided to compare living organisms with 
economic agents, an idea that freed evolutionary theories from the goal-directedness of 
Lamarckism, since individual decisions are like abductive inferences that open up a panoply of 
possibilities in the population that are to be tested by natural selection. Cognition is always 
mediated by signs that are to be interpreted, therefore the set of data that serves as inputs 
for an abductive inference are never found in “pure state” instead, they are determined by 
the interpretance systems sensu Salthe (1993, p.16), that is the categories of the observer’s 
systems like modes of perception, previous theories and so on. Likewise evolution takes place 
within interrelations of mutual dependence in which the selected habits of diverse entities are 
interlocked. Contexts and habits belong to the general, for they confer regularities to the 
forms of action and perception. The concrete articulation to the diverse contexts determines 
the field of possible hypotheses. Abduction obeys a logic determined by a hierarchy of 
contexts and so on ad infinitum. Abductive logic is the common ground of the evolution of 
ideas and the evolution of life forms, and is associated with an element of indetermination 
and free will that has been targeted by the opponents of evolution. Evolution does not obey 
to a wholly deductive logic, its logic is the logic of abduction, instead of conforming to a 
predetermined natural plan, it constantly produces ever more specific and differentiated 
forms that bifurcate in unpredictable ways. 
 





I acknowledge the support of the Department of Biology of the Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia. I am grateful to Roberto Perry and Lorena Ham for carefully reading the 
paper and suggesting style adjustments. I thank also to Edwina Taborsky, Stan Salthe 
and Yusleni Fierro for valuable comments and suggestions made to a previous version 
of this paper. I want also extend my gratitude to the anonymous reviewer that made 
positive and interesting comments to the submitted version. 
 
References 
Aalto, K.R. 2004. Clarence King 1842-1901 Pioneering Geologist of the West. GSA 
TODAY. February 2004. pp 18-19. GSA History of Geology Division. 
Andrade, E. 2003. Los demonios de Darwin. Semiótica y termodinámica de la 
evolución biológica. UNIBIBLOS. Bogotá, Colombia. 
Andrade, E. 2004. On Maxwell’s demons and the origin of evolutionary variations: an 
internalist perspective. Acta Biotheoretica 52: 17-40. 
Andrade, E. 2005. The interrelation Genotype, Phenotype, Environment: a semiotic 
contribution to the Evolution/Development debate.  S.E.E.D. Journal (Semiotics, 
Evolution, Energy and Development). Vol.5. No. 2 pp: 27-65. 
www.library.utoronto.ca/see 
Andrade, E. 2007. A Semiotic Framework for Evolutionary and Developmental 
Biology. BioSystems 90: 389-404.  
Andrade, E. 2009. La Ontogenia del Pensamiento Evolutivo. Hacia una interpretación 
semiótica de la naturaleza. Sello Editorial Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
Bogotá. Colombia. 
Baldwin, J.M. 1896. A New Factor in Evolution. American Naturalist 30, (1896): 441-
451, 536-553. 
 
Signs vol. 5 (2011): pp. 112-146, 2011  
ISSN: 1902-8822 
143 
Barbieri, M. 2003. The Organic Codes. An Introduction to Semantic Biology. 
Cambridge University Press.  
Carroll, S.B. 2005. Endless Forms Most Beautiful. The New Science of Evo Devo. W.W. 
Norton & Company, New York, London. 
Chaisson, E.J. 2001. Cosmic Evolution. The Rise of Complexity in Nature. Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Darwin, C. [1859], 1997. The origin of species by means of Natural Selection or the 
preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. First edition, John 
Murray, London. Edition based on the text of first edition. ElecBook. London. 
Depew, D.J. & B.H. Weber. 1996. Darwinism Evolving. Systems Dynamics and the 
Genealogy of Natural Selection. A Bradford Book. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Esposito, J.L. 1980. Evolutionary Metaphysics. The Development of Peirce’s Theory of 
Categories. Ohio University Press. Athens, Ohio. P. 154. 
Kirschner, M.W. &  Gerhardt, J.C. 2005. The Plausibility of Life. Resolving Darwin’s 
dilemma. Yale University Press. New Haven and London.  
Griffiths, P.E., Gray, R.D. 1994. Developmental systems and evolutionary 
explanation. Journal of Philosophy, 16. pp 277-304. 
Harrowitz, N. 1988. The body of the detective model: Peirce and Poe. In: The Sign of 
the Three. Edited by U. Eco and T.A. Sebeok. Indiana University Press. 
Hoffmeyer, J., C. Emmeche 1991. Code-Duality and the Semiotics of Nature. In: 
Anderson, M., Merrell, F. (Eds.) On semiotics of Modeling. New York. Mouton de 
Gruyter. pp 117-166.  
Hoffmeyer, J. 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington. Indiana 
University Press. Bloomington & Indianapolis. 
Jablonka, E., M. J. Lamb 1995. Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution. The Lamarckian 
dimension. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Signs vol. 5 (2011): pp. 112-146, 2011  
ISSN: 1902-8822 
144 
Jablonka, E. & M. Lamb 1998. Epigenetic inheritance in evolution. Journal of 
Evolutionary Biology, 11:. 159-183. 
Jablonka, E. & M.J. Lamb. 2004. Evolution in four dimensions. Genetic, Epigenetic, 
Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life. A Bradford Book. The 
MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England. 
Jacob, F. 1977. Evolution and Tinkering. Science 196: 1161-1166 
Kauffman, S. 2000. Investigaciones. Oxford university Press. Oxford. 
Kirschner, M.W. & Gerhardt, J.  2005. The Plausibility of Life. Yale University Press. 
New Haven and London. 
Lamarck, J.B. 1986. [1809]  Filosofía zoológica. Presentación de Adriá Casinos. 
Editorial Alta Fulla. Mundo Científico. Barcelona.  
Levins, R. & Lewontin, R. 1985. The Dialectical Biologist. Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge MA. 
Levinthal, C. 1968. Are there pathways for protein folding. Journal de Chimie 
Physique et de Physico-Chimie Biologique 65: 44–45.  
Margaleff, R. 1996. Variaciones sobre el tema de la selección natural. Exploración, 
selección y decisión en sistemas complejos de baja energía. En Proceso al azar. 
Editado por J. Wagensberg. Metatemas 12. Tusquets Editores. Barcelona. 
España. 
Oyama, S. 2000. The Ontogeny of Information. Developmental Systems and 
Evolution. 2nd edition, revised and expanded. Duke University Press. 
Peirce, C.S. 1891. La Arquitectura de las Teorías. Traducción castellana de Marinés 
Bayas 2004. p: 439. The Monist I (Jan 1891): 161-76. CP 6. 7-34. 
Peirce, C.S. 1931-1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vols.1-8. C. 
Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. W. Burks (eds.). Cambridge, MA. Harvard 
University Press.   
Popper K.A. 1968. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 
Harper Torchbooks. New York.  
 
Signs vol. 5 (2011): pp. 112-146, 2011  
ISSN: 1902-8822 
145 
Richards, R.J. 1992. The Meaning of Evolution. The Morphological Construction and 
Ideological Reconstruction of Darwin’s Theory, Chicago. University of Chicago. 
Riedl, R. 1983. Biología del Conocimiento. Los fundamentos fiologenéticos de la 
razón. Ed. Labor Universitaria. Monografias. Barcelona.  
Salthe, S. 1993. Development and Evolution. Complexity and Change in Biology. A 
Bradford Book. The MIT Press. Cambridge, MA. 
Slack, J. 2002. Conrad Hal Waddington the last Renaisance biologist? Nature Reviews 
Genetics Vol. 3. pp: 889-895.  
Short, T.L. 2002. Darwin’s concept of final cause: neither new nor trivial. Biology and 
Philosophy 17: 323–340. 
Short, T.L. 2007. Peirce´s Theory of Signs. Cambridge University Press. Pp: 128-133. 
Stegmann U.E. 2004. The arbitrariness of the genetic code. Biology and Philosophy. 
Volume 19. Number 2. pp: 205-222. 
Taborsky, E. 2002. The Six Semiosic Predicates. SEED Journal (Semiosis, Evolution, 
Energy, Development), 3(2). pp 5-23. 
Taborsky, E. 2006. The Nature of the Sign as a WFF: a Well-Formed Formula. 
Conference on Computing Anticipatory Systems: CASYS AIP Conference 
Proceedings. Vol. 839. pp: 303-313. 
Taborsky, E. 2008. Biological Organisms as Semiosic Systems: The Importance of 
Strong and Weak Anticipation. SIGNS Journal pp: 146-187. 
Thompson D’Arcy 1942. On Growth and Form. Cambridge. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Uexküll, J. 1982. [1940] The Theory of Meaning. Semiotica 42/1: 25-82 
Waddington, C.H. 1957. The Strategy of the Genes. London. Geo Allen & Unwin. 
Waddington, C.H. 1961 Genetic assimilation. Advanced Genetics, 10. pp 257-293. 
 
 
Signs vol. 5 (2011): pp. 112-146, 2011  
ISSN: 1902-8822 
146 
Waddington, C.H. 1976. Depende la evolución del comportamiento al azar?, In: 
Hacia una biología teórica. Versión española de Mariano Franco Rivas. Alianza 
Editorial, S.A. Madrid.  
West-Eberhardt, M.J. 2003. Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. Oxford 
University Press. New York.  
Zurek, W.H., 1990. Algorithmic information content, Church - Turing Thesis, Physical 
Entropy, and Maxwell's demon. In: Zurek, W.H (ed.), Complexity, Entropy, and 
the Physics of Information, SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Vol. VIII. 
pp: 73-89. Addison-Wesley. 
